May 13, 2007
Investing
Manager Frets Over the Market, but Still Outdoes It
By GERALDINE FABRIKANT
EARNING 22 percent on your investments while holding half of your portfolio in cash is no easy trick, but last year Seth A. Klarman pulled it off, and it was not the first time.
Mr. Klarman, a 49-year-old hedge fund manager, has turned in market-beating performances since 1983, while perpetually warning that the markets were dangerous and that investors should minimize risk.
What is his investment approach? He will not spell it out, although lots of people would like to know. On the Web, the price for his out-of-print 1991 book — “Margin of Safety: Risk-Averse Value Investing Strategies for the Thoughtful Investor” — has gone for $1,200 on Amazon and $2,000 on eBay.
At a time when hedge fund managers seem to be grabbing headlines with stories about their homes, hobbies, philanthropy and outsize compensation, Mr. Klarman keeps a low profile, and is reticent about the investments of his $7 billion Baupost Group of hedge funds, which has been closed to new money for the last seven years.
But his book, his letters to investors and other fund documents provide some clues about his thinking, and he added to the picture in a telephone interview. Mr. Klarman clearly sees himself as a deep value investor, in the mold of Warren E. Buffett or Benjamin Graham, the Columbia professor who pioneered value investing.
He is also a world-class worrier. In one letter, Mr. Klarman said, “At Baupost, we are big fans of fear, and in investing, it is clearly better to be scared than sorry.” In an earlier note, he wrote, “Rather than ratchet up risk, our approach has been to hold cash in the absence of opportunity.”
Last year, the cash holdings of his hedge funds amounted to 49.8 percent of assets, an enormous proportion for actively managed investments, but not an anomaly at Baupost: a year earlier, the cash holdings amounted to 45.8 percent. To add safety to his portfolios, he said that he usually eschews leverage, or debt, in his funds, using it only in some real estate investments. Instead, he has profited handsomely from investing in the debt of other companies, particularly those in financial distress.
Mr. Klarman, who is based in Boston and works with a team of 24 people, does not make bets on the overall market. Instead, his funds look for specific opportunities that he deems worthy. But he warns that Wall Street often tries to sell customers overvalued assets. For example, he said that he is wary of new issues because in the pursuit of large fees, banks may underwrite overpriced or highly risky securities.
Mr. Klarman’s record has generated intense loyalty from investors. Since he began Baupost in 1983, it has posted an average annual total return of 19.55 percent, according to data provided by the hedge fund group. Declines have been posted in only 11 of the total 97 quarters since Baupost’s debut.
In 2006, Baupost’s portfolio held an array of assets, including United States, European, Asian and Canadian equities, which accounted for 17.1 percent of the portfolio; debt and real estate, which each made up 10 percent; and 4.7 percent in private equity funds. And there was that big dollop of cash.
“Seth has a remarkable record, and even more so when you realize that he has achieved it by holding significant amounts of cash,” said Jack R. Meyer, who until 2005 ran Harvard’s endowment, which has been a longtime investor in Baupost.
“In other words, his risk-adjusted numbers are spectacular. What is unusual is the high return and the high cash levels,” added Mr. Meyer, who now runs the investment fund Convexity Capital.
Mr. Klarman grew up in Baltimore, where his father was a health economist. After graduating from Cornell with a degree in economics in 1979, he worked for Max Heine and Michael Price at Mutual Shares for a year and a half, then went on to Harvard Business School, where he graduated with an M.B.A. in 1982. Immediately afterward, four wealthy families, including those of two Harvard professors, put up $27 million for Mr. Klarman to manage.
While his actual compensation has not been disclosed, years of high returns have made him wealthy. Baupost charges a 1 percent management fee on investments in its funds, as well as 20 percent of annual profit. It was managing roughly $6 billion at the end of 2005 — which would mean a $60 million management fee for Baupost. In addition, its 22 percent return on investments last year would suggest profit of about $1.3 billion — generating a 20 percent share for Baupost of about $260 million. The only leverage Mr. Klarman said he used was on the 10 percent of holdings in real estate, where the leverage was one to one.
Despite more than two decades of smart choices, Mr. Klarman seems to obsess continually about potential crises. In his most recent letter, he said that while investors had been upbeat because of relatively low market volatility and inexpensive credit, he was worried about trade imbalances and high levels of consumer debt, which he said could set off market declines. Writing about the stock market rally in 2006, he said: “There was nothing about this party that would have made you want to leave early, unless you were a value investor. The only adverse trend was the scarcity of mispricing opportunities.”
One place in which he said he had found some mispricing was in the shares of News Corporation stock, which rose 37 percent in 2006. While Baupost sold 1.8 million shares last year, at the end of December, it still owned 4.19 million shares, according to company filings. Last week, Mr. Klarman said he believed the stock was still undervalued. He added that he was not concerned about Rupert Murdoch’s bid for Dow Jones & Company, at a price many have described as extremely generous, because it would be a relatively small transaction for a company the size of News Corporation.
Other Baupost equity holdings include Home Depot and Posco, a Korean steel manufacturer, two stocks that happen to be held by Berkshire Hathaway, Mr. Buffett’s company.
Figuring out which distressed bonds Baupost owns is more difficult. For competitive reasons, Baupost does not name the companies, but last year Mr. Klarman told investors that its second-largest single annual gain came from an holding in NationsRent, a company that rents equipment to builders. NationsRent filed for bankruptcy in 2001. The next year Baupost invested about $100 million in the defaulted bank debt.
A year later, NationsRent reorganized. Baupost put in about $50 million in fresh capital in exchange for stock and ended up with a total of more than two-thirds of the stock. Last year, Sunbelt Rentals bought the company for $1 billion in cash and the assumption of debt. Mr. Klarman said that Baupost more than doubled its investment.
In the interview, Mr. Klarman said that he found bankruptcy investing appealing because the process of bankruptcy itself can help unlock the value of an investment.
“There is a catalyst,” he said, “because the way you make money is dependent on specific situations; the bankruptcy process itself will deliver you securities in the reorganized company.”
DESPITE Baupost’s stellar returns, Mr. Klarman’s team continues to take out what he calls “disaster insurance.” Last year it emphasized gold, which would appreciate if the dollar and other currencies declined in value. Although Baupost did not indicate the size of its wager, it did tell investors in one of its funds that 2.87 percentage points of about 20 percent in total fund profit came from a bet that the precious metal would rise. He wrote that gold was underpriced because investors in this “goldilocks” era have not worried enough about currency devaluation.
Baupost has had its setbacks. In 2006 it lost money on an investment in TRM, which operates automated teller machines. “It seemed cheap on cash flow, but its business deteriorated after Hurricane Katrina,” Mr. Klarman said. “It did not turn out to be as stable a business as we thought.”
Baupost has done better with real estate. Last year, Coastal Management Resources, a company in which Baupost has an equity stake, bought the neighboring Cojo and Jalama Ranches north of Santa Barbara, Calif. Although neither the size of Baupost’s investment in Coastal Management nor the purchase price of the ranches is known, the asking price was $155 million.
The ranch purchases may reflect Mr. Klarman’s passion for horses. He has owned racehorses, and even at the track his penchant for details is manifest. One of his horses, now retired, is named Read the Footnotes.
Sunday, May 13, 2007
NBER Prog. on Economic Fluctuations and Growth
I ran across work done at the National Bureau of Economic Research’s program on economic fluctuations and growth (www.nber.org/programs/efg/). The bureau is the nonpartisan, nonprofit institute whose macroeconomists conduct their own research and ascertain the timing of the nation’s booms and recessions. There are 177 current members from academia (primarily, i believe). Their recent report on the current business cycle was notable for its comparison to current post-recession gdp performance vis-a-vis average for previous 6 recessions.
Quarterly Real GDP: The dark line shows the movement of quarterly real GDP in 2000-2003 and the shaded line the average over the previous 6 recessions. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce (www.bea.doc.gov).
The current recovery has not seen as high a growth rate of real GDP as in the average recovery. In addition, productivity has grown unusually rapidly during the recession and recovery. As a result, employment has continued to decline slightly during the recovery. In dating the trough, the committee relied on the tradition of the Bureau's business-cycle dating procedure that emphasized output as the measure of economic activity, rather than employment.
Quarterly Real GDP: The dark line shows the movement of quarterly real GDP in 2000-2003 and the shaded line the average over the previous 6 recessions. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce (www.bea.doc.gov).
The current recovery has not seen as high a growth rate of real GDP as in the average recovery. In addition, productivity has grown unusually rapidly during the recession and recovery. As a result, employment has continued to decline slightly during the recovery. In dating the trough, the committee relied on the tradition of the Bureau's business-cycle dating procedure that emphasized output as the measure of economic activity, rather than employment.
Saturday, May 12, 2007
BizWk article on China economy
Economics April 23, 2007, 12:01AM EST text size: TT
Why Taming the China Dragon Is Tricky
Slowing down China's high-speed economy is devilishly hard to do, and may even be beyond Beijing's control
by Brian Bremner
It's a problem a lot of developing countries would die for. Yet Beijing faces a policy quandary of the highest order. China's $2.6 trillion economy, which blew away market expectations and clocked 11.1% growth in the first quarter, is rushing along like some blisteringly fast, runaway maglev train. Chinese President Hu Jintao's economic team in Beijing has been trying to tap the brakes to avoid a reprise of the painful boom-and-bust scenario that hit the country in the mid-1990s, yet hasn't managed to do so despite three years of effort.
China's seemingly unstoppable surge was a big topic on the podiums and in the hallways at the 2007 Boao Forum for Asia, a gathering of regional leaders and executives held in the southern province and resort island of Hainan on Apr. 20-21. Another prime subject: the global economic risks of a China that might jump the rails.
While China's restrictive currency policy that has kept the yuan relatively cheap gets much of the blame, Beijing is having trouble wrestling with this economic beast for lots of reasons that cut to the basic structure of China's economy. Among them is a massive savings glut in the corporate sector, the globalization of manufacturing networks, and the still vast developmental needs of an economy that must generate 15 million-plus jobs annually to avoid widespread joblessness and social unrest. Here is a quick guide to some of the issues:
Just how strong is the Chinese economy right now?
The world has never seen such a sudden and sustained rise of an economy that was so desperately poor just three decades ago. China has averaged 9.6% growth rates for 30 years and is now the fourth-biggest economy in the world—and likely will overtake Germany as No. 3 in the next year or so. It's the third-biggest trading nation: Two-way trade between China and the rest of the world hit $1.76 trillion last year.
China's nearly $1.2 trillion stockpile of foreign currency is the biggest on the planet, a reflection of the mainland's role as the biggest creditor economy and massive capital power. Lured by cheap labor and a white-hot Chinese domestic economy, foreign companies pumped about $60 billion in direct investment last year, and the country's global trade surplus came in at a record $177 billion. "No nation has moved as fast as China in establishing a global footprint," marveled Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz at the Boao gathering.
Sounds like party time. Why are Chinese leaders worried?
Lost in all the breathless talk about China's overall economic performance is the cold, hard reality that the country's per capita gross domestic product is only $2,000 per person. There are huge income imbalances between China's big-city and rural provinces, years of rapid development have ravaged the environment, and the pressure to create fresh jobs and provide adequate social welfare policies is awesome in a country that is home to 1.3 billion people, about one-fifth of humanity.
"China remains a developing economy that has a long way to go before it can achieve modernization," says Wu Bangguo, chairman of China's National People's Congress standing committee. A big runup in inflation or an economic bubble that bursts would be absolutely catastrophic for hundreds of millions of Chinese families barely making ends meet—not to mention for Hu and his comrades running the show in China's one-party Communist regime.
Why doesn't Beijing just ratchet up interest rates to cool things off?
China did so in March, when the People's Bank of China increased a key benchmark, the one-year interest rate, by 27 basis points, to 6.39%. The one-year deposit rate was nudged up by the same amount, to 2.79%. It was the third such interest-rate hike in the past 12 months—and one or two more credit tightening moves are likely in 2007.
Yet here's the thing: China needs to slow down investment in factories and public works projects, which drive 40% of overall gross domestic product growth. Slowing down loan growth helps, but not in a country where all manner of state-owned companies (about 50% of the corporate sector) are enjoying double-digit profit growth and don't have to pay dividends like big publicly traded companies in the West. They are awash in cash and will keep investing into overcrowded sectors like autos, steel, cement, and construction.
China has an enormous pile of savings (the national savings rate is an awesome 50%), and the retained earnings the corporate sector is now generating is a big reason for this. Gang Fan, an economist and president of the Beijing-based National Economic Research Institute, points out that 5% to 10% of the national income the economy generates is now getting socked away by state-owned companies because the government doesn't require a dividend payment, which publicly traded foreign companies have to pay to shareholders. "It's quite a serious problem," he says, regarding the efforts by Beijing to slow things down.
What about throwing some ice water on the export sector by letting the yuan appreciate?
Beijing financial authorities probably could do more in this area, but it is not a magic bullet for two reasons: the weak consuming power of most individual Chinese consumers and the mainland's critical role as a final assembly platform for global companies. One big driver of China's rapidly expanding trade numbers is that ordinary Chinese families aren't spending enough on foreign goods.
True, there is plenty of conspicuous consumption in prosperous coastal cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, but there are also 700 million Chinese in the hinterland who don't buy Rolls-Royce Phantom sedans and Gucci handbags. China is reluctant to risk a major slowdown because these folks would get crushed. Beijing needs to keep the economy stoked in high-speed mode until China's vast income gap closes more. "The income disparity is behind the low consumption," figures Yifu Lin, a professor and director of the China Center for Economic Research at Beijing University (see BusinessWeek.com, 4/30/07, "China's Cautious Consumers").
Consider, too, that some of the biggest exporters out of China are actually foreign companies from Taiwan, Japan, the U.S., and Europe. There are some 600,000 overseas-funded companies operating in China. They import goods, assemble them on the mainland with cheap labor, slap on the "Made in China" label, and then ship mobile phones, desktop computers, and sedans to the rest of the world. These products get counted as Chinese exports but are really pieced together with components from around the world.
China can't really order Honda (HMC) or Nokia (NOK) to export less out of China. And the kind of trade sanctions being contemplated by trade hawks in the U.S. would ultimately hurt foreign corporate interests in China, too. "This is a problem of economic globalization," not just Chinese policies, reckons Yongtu Long, a former Chinese trade negotiator and secretary general of the Boao Forum.
What's the way out of all of this?
Short term, China needs to boost private consumption by shifting tax breaks away from the cash-rich corporate sector and toward Chinese families. A stronger social safety net—more affordable health care and education and secure pensions—would give them more confidence in their futures and get them spending more.
Beijing also needs to crack down on banks and local governments that keep lending and spending, despite the risks to the entire country if the economy overheats. Phased-in liberalization of the yuan, interest rates, and capital flows is another needed reform. This would allow market forces to send price signals to policymakers and executives alike about when to slow down and speed up.
Yet this is going to take many years, if not a decade, to realize. Chinese authorities, naturally enough, are far more concerned about the living standards of their own people than those of the comfortable middle class in the U.S. They probably will do just enough to avert trade sanctions from the U.S. It would take a dramatic currency shift to really improve the trade balance with the U.S.—but that would risk destroying China's fragile social balance. From China's perspective, "it's about hundreds of millions of rural workers," says Chinese economist Fan.
Bremner is Asia Regional Editor for BusinessWeek in Hong Kong.
Why Taming the China Dragon Is Tricky
Slowing down China's high-speed economy is devilishly hard to do, and may even be beyond Beijing's control
by Brian Bremner
It's a problem a lot of developing countries would die for. Yet Beijing faces a policy quandary of the highest order. China's $2.6 trillion economy, which blew away market expectations and clocked 11.1% growth in the first quarter, is rushing along like some blisteringly fast, runaway maglev train. Chinese President Hu Jintao's economic team in Beijing has been trying to tap the brakes to avoid a reprise of the painful boom-and-bust scenario that hit the country in the mid-1990s, yet hasn't managed to do so despite three years of effort.
China's seemingly unstoppable surge was a big topic on the podiums and in the hallways at the 2007 Boao Forum for Asia, a gathering of regional leaders and executives held in the southern province and resort island of Hainan on Apr. 20-21. Another prime subject: the global economic risks of a China that might jump the rails.
While China's restrictive currency policy that has kept the yuan relatively cheap gets much of the blame, Beijing is having trouble wrestling with this economic beast for lots of reasons that cut to the basic structure of China's economy. Among them is a massive savings glut in the corporate sector, the globalization of manufacturing networks, and the still vast developmental needs of an economy that must generate 15 million-plus jobs annually to avoid widespread joblessness and social unrest. Here is a quick guide to some of the issues:
Just how strong is the Chinese economy right now?
The world has never seen such a sudden and sustained rise of an economy that was so desperately poor just three decades ago. China has averaged 9.6% growth rates for 30 years and is now the fourth-biggest economy in the world—and likely will overtake Germany as No. 3 in the next year or so. It's the third-biggest trading nation: Two-way trade between China and the rest of the world hit $1.76 trillion last year.
China's nearly $1.2 trillion stockpile of foreign currency is the biggest on the planet, a reflection of the mainland's role as the biggest creditor economy and massive capital power. Lured by cheap labor and a white-hot Chinese domestic economy, foreign companies pumped about $60 billion in direct investment last year, and the country's global trade surplus came in at a record $177 billion. "No nation has moved as fast as China in establishing a global footprint," marveled Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz at the Boao gathering.
Sounds like party time. Why are Chinese leaders worried?
Lost in all the breathless talk about China's overall economic performance is the cold, hard reality that the country's per capita gross domestic product is only $2,000 per person. There are huge income imbalances between China's big-city and rural provinces, years of rapid development have ravaged the environment, and the pressure to create fresh jobs and provide adequate social welfare policies is awesome in a country that is home to 1.3 billion people, about one-fifth of humanity.
"China remains a developing economy that has a long way to go before it can achieve modernization," says Wu Bangguo, chairman of China's National People's Congress standing committee. A big runup in inflation or an economic bubble that bursts would be absolutely catastrophic for hundreds of millions of Chinese families barely making ends meet—not to mention for Hu and his comrades running the show in China's one-party Communist regime.
Why doesn't Beijing just ratchet up interest rates to cool things off?
China did so in March, when the People's Bank of China increased a key benchmark, the one-year interest rate, by 27 basis points, to 6.39%. The one-year deposit rate was nudged up by the same amount, to 2.79%. It was the third such interest-rate hike in the past 12 months—and one or two more credit tightening moves are likely in 2007.
Yet here's the thing: China needs to slow down investment in factories and public works projects, which drive 40% of overall gross domestic product growth. Slowing down loan growth helps, but not in a country where all manner of state-owned companies (about 50% of the corporate sector) are enjoying double-digit profit growth and don't have to pay dividends like big publicly traded companies in the West. They are awash in cash and will keep investing into overcrowded sectors like autos, steel, cement, and construction.
China has an enormous pile of savings (the national savings rate is an awesome 50%), and the retained earnings the corporate sector is now generating is a big reason for this. Gang Fan, an economist and president of the Beijing-based National Economic Research Institute, points out that 5% to 10% of the national income the economy generates is now getting socked away by state-owned companies because the government doesn't require a dividend payment, which publicly traded foreign companies have to pay to shareholders. "It's quite a serious problem," he says, regarding the efforts by Beijing to slow things down.
What about throwing some ice water on the export sector by letting the yuan appreciate?
Beijing financial authorities probably could do more in this area, but it is not a magic bullet for two reasons: the weak consuming power of most individual Chinese consumers and the mainland's critical role as a final assembly platform for global companies. One big driver of China's rapidly expanding trade numbers is that ordinary Chinese families aren't spending enough on foreign goods.
True, there is plenty of conspicuous consumption in prosperous coastal cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, but there are also 700 million Chinese in the hinterland who don't buy Rolls-Royce Phantom sedans and Gucci handbags. China is reluctant to risk a major slowdown because these folks would get crushed. Beijing needs to keep the economy stoked in high-speed mode until China's vast income gap closes more. "The income disparity is behind the low consumption," figures Yifu Lin, a professor and director of the China Center for Economic Research at Beijing University (see BusinessWeek.com, 4/30/07, "China's Cautious Consumers").
Consider, too, that some of the biggest exporters out of China are actually foreign companies from Taiwan, Japan, the U.S., and Europe. There are some 600,000 overseas-funded companies operating in China. They import goods, assemble them on the mainland with cheap labor, slap on the "Made in China" label, and then ship mobile phones, desktop computers, and sedans to the rest of the world. These products get counted as Chinese exports but are really pieced together with components from around the world.
China can't really order Honda (HMC) or Nokia (NOK) to export less out of China. And the kind of trade sanctions being contemplated by trade hawks in the U.S. would ultimately hurt foreign corporate interests in China, too. "This is a problem of economic globalization," not just Chinese policies, reckons Yongtu Long, a former Chinese trade negotiator and secretary general of the Boao Forum.
What's the way out of all of this?
Short term, China needs to boost private consumption by shifting tax breaks away from the cash-rich corporate sector and toward Chinese families. A stronger social safety net—more affordable health care and education and secure pensions—would give them more confidence in their futures and get them spending more.
Beijing also needs to crack down on banks and local governments that keep lending and spending, despite the risks to the entire country if the economy overheats. Phased-in liberalization of the yuan, interest rates, and capital flows is another needed reform. This would allow market forces to send price signals to policymakers and executives alike about when to slow down and speed up.
Yet this is going to take many years, if not a decade, to realize. Chinese authorities, naturally enough, are far more concerned about the living standards of their own people than those of the comfortable middle class in the U.S. They probably will do just enough to avert trade sanctions from the U.S. It would take a dramatic currency shift to really improve the trade balance with the U.S.—but that would risk destroying China's fragile social balance. From China's perspective, "it's about hundreds of millions of rural workers," says Chinese economist Fan.
Bremner is Asia Regional Editor for BusinessWeek in Hong Kong.
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